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In the complex urban civilization of the United States
of the twentieth century, one of the most insistent and vital
problems challenging American municipalities is that of
municipal zoning. At an earlier time in the history of our
country, little thought was devoted to city planning and
zoning, for municipalities were relatively few and of small
size, and the vast bulk of the American people lived a sim-
ple rural life. It was an age believing in the maximum of
individual liberty of conduct and the minimum of govern-
mental control. Regulation was regarded as savoring of
tyranny; and the doctrine of laissez-faire was extolled.
But all this has changed, with the amazing urbanization of
American life during the last few decades; and state super-
vision, in response to the popular denrand, is being extended
further and further into all fields of social, industrial, and
political activity. The building of factories and other in-
dustrial establishments, the construction of apartment
houses, the herding of humanity into crowded tenements,
and the development of means of rapid transit by rail and
by motor vehicle have resulted in an ever increasing need
of city planning and zoning, primarily to "prevent conges-
tion of population, secure quiet residence districts, expedite
local transportation, and facilitate the suppression of dis-
order, the extinguishment of fires, and the enforcement
of traffic and sanitary regulations,"' but incidentally to en-
hance the aesthetic attractiveness of our urban communi-
ties.
Now, a question which immediately arises is this: How
far can a municipality go in a program of zoning regula-
* A.M. 1924, LL.B., 1927, West Virginia University.
I City of Aurora v. Burns, 819 II1. 84, 149 N. E. 784 (1926).
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tions which tend, directly or indirectly, to promote munici-
pal aesthetics. "Particularly to what extent may a city,
under its so-called police power, legally beautify its build-
ings, streets and open spaces by zoning ordinances or
otherwise? If a city's charter or a statute purports to
authorize such municipal beautification, may the city legally
divide its territory into 'residence districts,' 'business dis-
tricts' and 'unrestricted districts,' and prohibit the build-
ing of business houses in residence districts, or unsightly
houses, or unsightly advertising signs in any district? To
illustrate, could a city prohibit the building of a public
garage, or a gasoline filling station, or an apartment house
in its exclusively residential zone ?"
2
Aside from the possible use of the power of eminent
domain,8 the only practical means by which a city may
effectuate its aesthetic purposes would be by the exercise of
the police power. But does the scope of the police power
cover purely aesthetic considerations? It is generally rec-
ognized that the police power extends to all matters affect-
ing the peace, order, health, morals, convenience, safety,
and general welfare of the community.4 It is not so gener-
ally recognized that aesthetics fall within the police power;
in fact, until recent years, the universally accepted belief
has been that matters pertaining to city beautification are
not properly subject to the exercise of the police power, and
that is the view still held by many courts.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has on
more than one occasion denied the legality of zoning ordi-
nances which have attempted to regulate the height of
buildings, or to establish and enforce street building
lines, when the object sought to be accomplished was
purely of an aesthetic character. In Fruth v. Board of
Affairs,8 the court decided that a municipal corporation
could not establish a building line and prevent the property
owners from building nearer to the street than that line,
2 Note, "Legal Limitation on Municipal Beautification." 30 W. VA.. L. QuAn. 191
(1924).
L Izwis, EMINEN DOMAIN. 8rd ed., 271 (1909) ; Attorney General v. Williams, 174
Mass. 476, 55 N. E. '7 (1899). sustaining an act of the Legislature of Massachusetts
which limited the height of buildings around Copley Square in Boston and about the
State House and provided compensation to the property owners affected.
6 Fruth v. Board of Affairs, '75 W. Va. 456, 84 S. E. 105, L. R. A. 1915C 981
(1915) ; McQUILL . MUN. Copps. 889 (1913).
5 Froth v. Board of Affairs, supra, n. 4.
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [1927], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol33/iss4/3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
because the purpose of the municipal regulation was purely
aesthetic. And two years thereafter, in State ex reZ. Sale v.
Stahlman,6 in which case a municipality, under an express
grant of police power, attempted to prevent a property
owner from erecting a one-story structure on a lot situated
between comparatively high buildings, the Supreme Court
held that the action of, the city was not a permissible exer-
cise of the police power, because the purpose of the munici-
pal regulation was aesthetic and, such being the case, was
not within the police power. During the ten years inter-
vening since the Stalhman Case, there has been no further
decision in this jurisdiction squarely in point, but the court,
by way of dictum, in a case7 decided as recently as 1923,
indicated that they would adhere to the view taken in their
previous decisions. The basis of our court's ruling, in these
cases, has been that "an aesthetic purpose, apparently be-
cause everybody doesn't appreciate an aesthetic purpose, is
not protected under the police power, and therefore to limit
the use of one's property to aesthetic uses would be to de-
prive the owner of property without due process of law."8
However, in another rather recent case of a somewhat
analogous character, the West Virginia Court seemed to
be more liberally disposed toward aesthetic purposes. In
that case, the property owners on a certain street in Hunt-
ington brought suit to restrain the city from repaving the
street and charging the costs to the abutting owners, and
alleged in their bill that the existing paving met the public
need as well as the paving which the municipality was
planning to lay, and that the proposed repaving was solely
for the purpose of beautifying the city. The court, in
sustaining a demurrer to the bill, held that these allega-
tions were not sufficient to warrant an injunction restrain-
ing the proper municipal authorities from proceeding with
the repaving.0 Perhaps this case may be indicative of a
tendency on the part of the court to break away from the
- 81 W. Va. 835. 94 S. E. 497 (1917).
, State ez reL Nunley v. Mayor and City Council of Montgomery, 94 W. Va. 189,
117 S. E. 888 (1923).
Supra, n. 2.
Holswade v, City of Huntington, 96 W. Va. 124, 122 S. E. 449 (1924), 97 W. Va.
2713, 124 S. E. 918 (1924); Note, "Municipal Corporations-Compulsory Repaving for
,Aesthetic Purposes," 81 W. VA. L. Qttam 222 (1925).
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strict construction put upon the scope of the police power
in previous decisions.
But "law is a practical matter,"10 and many courts are
coming to recognize the practical need, under the condi-
tions of our highly urbanized civilization of today, of
zoning our cities, with the purpose of making them more
healthful, quiet, attractive, and beautiful, and safer and
better places in which to live. Some courts, which formerly
denied the exercise of the police power as a means of
fostering the aesthetic even incidentally, have come to
grasp the significance of the conception of the law as a
growing thing, and that with changing conditions there
must be a changed conception in regard to the scope of the
police power, a conception which keeps abreast of present
needs and endeavors to secure the maximum of social and
public interests, including perhaps a due regard for the
aesthetic sensibilities of the community; and, in conse-
quence, these courts have arrived at conclusions which are
substantially contra in result to the West Virginia deci-
sions which have been reviewed supra.
The California Court has taken the position that regula-
tions governing municipal development under a comprehen-
sive zoning plan tend to promote the general welfare of
the community affected, and that the adoption and en-
forcement of such a plan, when fairly conceived and im-
partially applied, is within the scope of the city's police
power; and that the establishment, as part of such com-
prehensive zoning program, of strictly private residential
areas, from lvhich are absolutely excluded tenements,
apartments, general public enterprises, and similar struc-
tures, is a legitimate exercise of the police power, the crea-
tion of such strictly private residential districts being for
the general welfare of the community, because it tends to
"promote and perpetuate the American home."1'
Oregon, likewise, has taken a broad view of the exercise
of the police power, in sustaining local zoning ordinances
enacted pursuant to legislative authority, governing the
use of property for business purposes in a densely popu-
U Pound, "Juristic Science and Law," 31 HAav. L. REY. 1047, 1058 (1918).
Miller v. Board of Public Works of City of Los Angeles, 195 Cal. 477, 284 Pa.
881. 88 A. L. R. 1479 (1925).
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lated city, and in holding that they do not violate the due
process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, unless they
are clearly unreasonable and arbitrary and do not operate
uniformly on all similarly situated in a particular district
not arbitrarily established. In this case, the ordinance up-
held was one prohibiting the erection in certain districts of
creamery buildings. Here, it was judicially recognized
that creameries, with their boilers, milk cans, delivery
trucks, and the like, are subject to different regulation from
that appropriate to private dwellings, and that an ordi-
nance, forbidding their erection in certain localities, based
on fair classification, applying to all alike within the en-
tire city and depriving property owners of no part of their
property interests, is valid.12
In a comparatively recent leading case on zoning,13 the
Massachusetts Court, cited with approval an earlier case
which stated the law on the point to be that: "The inhabi-
tants of a city or town cannot be compelled to give up
rights in property, or to pay taxes, for purely aesthetic ob-
jects; but if the primary and substantive purpose of the
legislation is such as justifies the act, considerations of
taste and beauty may enter in, as auxiliary."'14 Another
recent Massachusetts case has held that a zoning by-law,
prohibiting the erection of business buildings within speci-
fied districts, but exempting from its operation existing busi-
ness structures, and permitting additions, alterations, or en-
largements upon cause shown, does not deny to one desir-
ing to construct a new building the equal protection of the
laws.1
In the case of Lincoln T rust Company v. Williams Build.
ing Corporation,' the New York Court of Appeals sus-
tained as a proper exercise of the police power a resolution
of the board of estimate and apportionment of New York
City which divided the real estate into districts and regu-
lated the size and height of buildings and the location of
trades and industries.
12 Kroner v. City of Portland, 240 Pac. 536 (Ore. 1925).
1 In re Opinion of the Justices. 234 Mass. 597, 127 N. E. 525 (1920).
16 Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 745 (1907).
15 Spector v. Building Inspector of Milton, 250 Mass. 63, 145 N. E. 265 (1924).
10 229 N. Y. 813, 128 N. E. 209 (1920).
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A liberal tendency has likewise been revealed by com-
paratively recent decisions in several other states, including
Illinois, Texas and Louisiana. In the Illinois case of City
of Aurora v. Burns,17 a state statute and the zoning
ordinance of the City of Aurora enacted pursuant thereto
were held not to deny the constitutional guarantees of due
process and the equal protection of the law. In Texas,
the court passed upon an ordinance enacted in San Antonio
prohibiting the establishment of private meat markets with-
in six blocks of the municipal market house, and sustained
the ordinance as being a valid exercise of the police power
under the city charter, which authorized the council to
regulate meat markets and prevent the sale of meats in cer-
tain locations, and as not being in contravention of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Consti-
tution.18
State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans,19 was a
case in which the relators claimed the right to establish
"Piggly-Wiggly" grocery stores in certain locations, in vio-
lation of an ordinance which prohibited business establish-
ments in designated residence streets and districts, but the
Louisiana Court was of the opinion that such ordinance did
not necessarily rest on aesthetic considerations, but might be
sustained on grounds of public health, safety, comfort, or
general welfare, in view of better police protection, econ-
omy in street paving, lessening of fire hazard, etc. In a
later case, 20 the same court held that an ordinance, requir-
ing the removal of all oil stations from a certain street,
and applying equally to all businesses similarly situated,
was not violative of the United States Constitution, or of
the Louisiana Constitution, as a denial of due process and
the equal protection of the law. And in still a third case,
the Louisiana Court has held a zoning ordinance not to deny
due process and the equal protection of the law. 24
A comprehensive zoning ordinance applies to all sections
of a municipality and "treats each section according to its
11 Supra, n. 1.
Tomassi v. City of San Antonio, 268 S. W. 273 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
154 La. 271, 97 So. 440, 38 A. L. R. 260 (1923).
State ex rel. National Oil Works of Louisiana v. McShane, 159 La. 723, 106 So.
262 (1925).
2 State ex reL Giftrosso v. City of New Orleans, 159 La. 1016, 106 So. 549 (1925).
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own peculiar needs, present and prospective." 22 Under
such a system, the land in each district would be benefited,
for it would be zoned for its most valuable and appropriate
use. Comprehensive zoning should be clearly distinguished
from "piecemeal zoning," the latter applying only to a
block, or a street, or other limited district. In fact, it
has been suggested that it is a rather inaccurate use of
words to designate block or piecemeal areas as "zones."
While such so-called zoning regulations have in some in-
stances been sustained by the courts, they have not infre-
quently been adjudged arbitrary and discriminatory and
a denial of the equal protection of the laws, and such ad-
verse decisions have been cited by unfriendly critics as
proof of the unconstitutionality of any kind of zoning, com-
prehensive or otherwise. But this objection cannot in fair-
ness bd urged against truly comprehensive zoning, because
its very comprehensiveness is such that "all the different
neighborhoods similarly situated and of like character are
treated in like manner."23
"Though zoning is a recent movement it is no longer
an experiment. On January 1, 1925, zoning ordinances
were in effect in three hundred and twenty municipalities
throughout the United States. Living within these zones
were more than twenty-four million citizens * * * . To
be constitutional there should be a good enabling act for
zoning and reasonable regulations in the ordinance, based
on the health, safety, morals, or general welfare. A
properly framed ordinance, enacted under power dele-
gated by the state should be constitutional * * * *
There seems to be no question as to zoning regulations for
height or area if framed with some relation to access of
light and air, fire protection or facility for fighting fire.
The subject of use is today the only 'zoning battleground
in the courts. Even there the courts are upholding
zoning for use in nine cases out of ten.' "24
However, there are some courts which still confine the
police power within more narrow limits, and, in conse-
Cuence, arrive at a result which is substantially contra to
that reached in the cases reviewed supra. For example,
2 Swan, "Law of Zoning," SUPPLMMENT TO NATIONAL MUN. RBV., 524 (1921).
Supra, n. 22.
" Baker, "The Constitutionality of Zoning Lawa" 20 ILL. L. Rv. 218, 217-218
(1925).
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the Georgia Court has recently held25 that a statute, author-
izing the redistricting and zoning of Atlanta, violated the
due process clause, to the extent to which it authorized the
prohibition by ordinance of the erection of stores in resi-
dential districts, and that an ordinance enacted thereunder
was void to such extent. This Georgia decision may be
taken as fairly typical of the attitude of the minority of
jurisdictions which tend to restrict the scope within which
the police power may operate.
If any doubt remains as to the constitutionality of the ex-
ercise of the police power by a municipal corporation in ef-
fectuating aesthetic ends incidentally, when the primary
purpose is to promote the peace, order, health, safety, and
general welfare of its inhabitants, that doubt should be re-
moved by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Village of Euclid, Ohio, et al. v. Ambler
;Readty Company,26 'decided as recently as November,
1926. The village of Euclid, a municipality adjoining and
practically a suburb of Cleveland, enacted an ordinance
which divided the village into zones and regulated the uses
to which the property in each zone might be put, the height
of buildings, and the area of lots. The complainant, a
realty company, owning land in "use" zones U-2, U-3 and
U-6, brought suit to restrain the enforcement of the ordi-
nance, on the ground that it deprived the complainant of lib-
erty and property without due process of law and denied it
the equal protection of the law, in derogation of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and, in
addition, violated provisions of the Constitution of Ohio. The
District Court of the United States for the Northern District
of Ohio held27 the ordinance unconstitutional and void, and
restrained its enforcement. The Village appealed, and the
United States Supreme Court, with three justices dissenting,
reversed the decree of the District Court. Mr. Justice
Sutherland, in delivering the opinion of the court, said,
in part:
"There is no serious difference of opinion in respect
of the validity of laws and regulations fixing the height
25 Smith v. City of Atlanta, 161 Ga. 769, 132 S. E. 60 (1926). In this case, a writ
of certiorari wa denied, City of Atlanta v. Smith, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep'r. 486 (1926).
" Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, Ohio, 297 Fed. 207 (1924).
8
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of buildings within reasonable limits, the character of
materials and methods of construction, and the adjoin-
ing area which must be left open, in order to minimize
the danger of fire or collapse,.the evils of overcrowding
and the like, and excluding from residential sections of-
fensive trades, industries and structures likely to create
nuisances * * * * * *
"We find no difficulty in sustaining [such] restrictions
* * * . The serious question in the case arises over
the provisions of the ordinance excluding from residen-
tial districts apartment houses, business houses, retail
stores and shops, and other like establishments. This
question involves the validity of what is really the crux
of the more recent zoning legislation, namely, the crea-
tion and maintenance of residential districts, from which
business and trade of every sort, including hotels and
apartment houses, are excluded. Upon that question this
court has not thus far spoken. The decisions of the state
courts are numerous and conflicting; but those which
broadly sustain the power greatly outnumber those which
deny it altogether or narrowly limit it, and it is very
apparent that there is a constantly increasing tendency
in the direction of the broader view * * * *.
"As evidence of the decided trend toward the broader
view, it is significant that in some instances the state
courts in later decisions have reversed their former deci-
sions holding the other way * * * * * .28
"These reports [of zoning commissions and experts],
which bear every evidence of painstaking consideration,
concur in the view that the segregation of residential,
business and industrial buildings will make it easier to
provide fire apparatus suitable for the character and in-
tensity of the development in each section; that it will
increase the safety and security of home life, greatly tend
to prevent street accidents, especially to children, by re-
ducing the traffic and resulting confusion in residential
sections, decrease noise and other conditions which pro-
duce or intensify nervous disorders, preserve a more fa-
vorable environment in which to rear children, etc. With
particular reference to apartment houses, it is pointed
out that the development of detached house sections is
" As an instance in this "decided trend" in which a state court has reversed Its
"former decisions holding the other way," the Supreme Court cited a recent Mihnesota
ese in which the Court of that state frankly stated: "We hold that a fair zoning
ordinance, resulting in the exclusion of a four family flat from a designated residential
district, Is constitutional. This holding is not in harmony with our earlier decisions.
It is directly opposed to the result reached [in prior cases] * * * * 0. So far a in
eanflict with the view now adopted, they are not to be followed." State ex rel. Beery v.
Houghton, Inspector of Buildings, 164 Minn. 146, 204 N. W. 669 (1925).
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greatly retarded by the coming of apartment houses,
which has sometimes resulted in destroying the entire
section for private house purposes."
And, in conclusion, the court holds that "the ordinance in
its general scope and dominant features, so far as its provi-
sions are here involved, i. a valid exercise of authority * *
* VP,
In this manner the highest court in the land has held that
a general zoning ordinance creating a residential district
and excluding therefrom apartment houses, business houses,
retail stores and shops, etc., is a valid exercise of police pow-
er, and does not violate the due process or equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States. The problem involved in the case is clear-
ly a Federal question, and consequently the decision is auth-
oritative as a point of constitutional law, when the question
in the future arises in the state courts, as it probably will in
West Virginia, because the West Virginia Revision and
Codification Commission has inserted in the proposed re-
vised code a comprehensive municipal planning and zoning
law. As it has been shown, the West Virginia cases have
looked with disfavor upon any city zoning savoring of an
aesthetic character; but it does not appear that there has
been a decision squarely on the point, for the past ten years,
and it is by no means certain that the strict view of the
scope of the proper exercise of the police power, declared
in the previous West Virginia decisions would now be fol-
lowed, especially if the program of city planning and
zoning, while incidentally tending to foster the aesthetic in
municipal life, is primarily directed to the protection of the
public health, safety, order, and general welfare.2
II
Another question, closely related to that of zoning for
the purposes discussed supra, has to do with the constitu-
tionality, by ordinance or otherwise, of the segregation of
races in municipalities. Until within the last few years,
the problem of dealing with a non-assimilable race existing
in large numbers in the midst of a more highly developed
civilization, was confined almost entirely to, the South; but,
I Supra, n. 5.
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due to the pronounced northward migration of the negro,
the problem has become national in scope. A considerable
number of municipalities have attempted, with varying re-
sults, to lessen the difficulties incident to the situation by
segregating tde races. The objects sought to be attained
have been to reduce' friction and strife, prevent miscegena-
tion, and protect property values from depreciation. In
some instances, property owners have endeavored to effec-
tuate these desires by covenants and conditions in convey-
ances, restricting the ownership and occupancy of the land
affected, or by resort to the injunctive aid of courts of
equity; another means employed has been by the enactment
of municipal segregation ordinances.
In California, it has been held that a condition subsequent
in a deed, that the property conveyed is not to be occupied
by a person not of Caucasian birth, is not such a discrimina-
tion as is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. In the case80 so holding, the
plaintiff was an investment company which owned a tract
of land containing one hundred sixty-seven lots, and
which was selling the lots, with covenants inserted in the
deeds that the grantees should not convey any of the
said lots to -persons not of the Caucasian race, nor permit
their occupancy thereof. Here, the defendant, Gary, had
acquired, after several mesne conveyances, one of the in-
vestment company's lots; with the intention of occupying it.
The court decided that the provision in the deed that the
property should not be sold to other than Caucasians w -A
an undue restraint on alienation and invalid under the Cali-
fo:rnia alienation statute, but that the restriction upon
its occupancy was merely a restraint on the use to be made
of it, and therefore valid and not in violation of the equal
protection clause, since the inhibition of discrimination in
the Fourteenth Amendment is upon the states and does not
apply to action by individuals-and the Court cites deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court to that effect.
More recently the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia, in an appeal from the Supreme Court of the
District, has helds that the constitutional right of a negro
t Los Angeles Inv. .Co. v. Gary. 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596 (1919).
11
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to acquire, own, or occupy property does not carry with it
the constitutional power to compel sale or conveyance to
him of any particular private property, and that where the
method adopted does not amount to denial of fundamenta'
constitutional rights, the segregation of races, whether by
statute or private agreement, is not against public policy.
In this case, the plaintiff and twenty-nine others, owners of
adjacent property, had covenanted not to convey any of the
property, with regard to which the covenants were made,
to negroes during a period of twenty-one years; and the
complainant's bill was filed to restrain one of his twenty-
nine co-covenantors from so conveying, and to restrain a
negro defendant from going into the occupancy of the
property sought to be conveyed.
In Spencer Chapel M. E. Church v. Brogan,32 white
residents in a colored district attempted to enjoin a negro
congregation from rebuilding their church on the site of
their former church structure, which had been destroyed by
fire. It had been an exclusively colored neighborhood,
into which white persons had gone and had purchased prop-
erty; nevertheless, the lower court granted the injunction
on the grounds that the new church building would be a
nuisance and would decrease the sale value of the plain-
tiffs' property. The appellate court reversed the decree,
saying that that which was attempted here was not the
preservation of a white community from being converted
into a negro district, but the conversion of a black area
into a white locality, but by preventing the rebuilding of the
church around which negro social life naturally centered,
and thereby causing the colored population to drift away.
Segregation ordinances have been sustained, in whole or
in part, by the court of last resort in a number of states. In
Louisiana, a municipal ordinance, which prohibited whites
or blacks from establishing residences or places of abode
in certain districts without the written consent of the in-
habitants of the area, if a majority thereof were persons of
the opposite race, has been held not to violate the Four-
teenth Amendment; and that such an ordinance is not an
actual race discrimination as to political and civil rights, but
:1 Corrlgan v. Buckley. 299 Fed. 899 (1924).
n 104 Okla. 123, 231 Pac. 1074 (1924) ; 98 Cent L. J. 93 (1925).
12
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merely a recognition of the social distinction between the
races, and an exercise of the police power.8
The race segregation ordinance of Atlanta, which pro-
hibited colored persons from occupying residences in blocks
in which the greater number of houses were occupied as
residences. by white people, and vice versa, and excepting
from its operation the right of occupancy of residences and
places of abode acquired before the passage of the ordi-
nance, was sustained, in Harden v. City of Atlanta,"4 as
not being a denial of the "equal protection of the laws"
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor in violation of the
Bill of Rights of the State Constitution, declaring that "pro-
tection to person and property is the paramount duty of
government, and shall be impartial and complete." This
ordinance was considered not to be subject to the constitu-
tional objection urged, and sustained, against an earlier
ordinance of Atlanta, which, in undertaking to segregate
the races, contained no exception as to rights in property
acquired previous to its enactment. Subsequent to the
passage of the present ordinance, the plaintiff, a negro,
rented a house in a "white block"; and, in consequence of
his failure to vacate the house when ordered so to do by
the municipal authorities, he was summoned before the re-
corder's court to answer a charge of violating the ordi-
nance, and was unsuccessful in his attempt to enjoin the
enforcement of the ordinance.
In two cases,85 which were heard together, the Virginia
Court declared that an ordinance for the segregation of
races within a municipality does not deny to any person the
equal protection of the laws. The ordinances in question
made it illegal for individuals of either race to occupy resi-
clences, or to establish schools or places of public assembly
in blocks where the greater number of residences were
occupied by members of the opposite race. In the Hopkins
Case, the plaintiffs in error, one a white man and the other
a negress, did not own the property which they occupied,
but moved into it, as renters, subsequently to the enactment
Tyler . Harmon. 158 La. 439. 104 So. 200 (1925) ; 98 Cent. L. J. 292 (1925).
, 147 Ga. 248, 93 S. E. 401 (1917).
" Hopkins and Others v. City of Richmond and Coleman v. Town of Abhland,
117 Va. 692, 86 S. E. 189 (1915).
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of the ordinance, and in violation thereof; and in the Cole-
man Case, the plaintiff, a negro, became the owner and
occupier of property in a "white" district, after passage of
the segregation regulations. By way of dictum, the court
said; "In so far, and only in so far, as the enactments in
question limit or restrict the right of any white or colored
person to move into and occupy property of which he was
the owner at the time such enactments went into effect, they
are beyond the police power of the municipalities and are
invalid and inoperative." It was contended that the pro-
visions of the ordinances were inseparable and must stand
or fall together, but the court held that it could divide
them, and sustain the valid parts while disregarding the in-
valid clauses; nor was the court's power to "give effect to
one feature of an ordinance when another feature thereof
is void * * * affected by the mere matter of articulation and
phraseology." Thus, the conclusion reached in the Vir-
ginia cases is in brief, that such an ordinance, in so far as
it does not disturb vested rights, is within the police power
of Virginia municipalities.
In 1913, the Maryland Court was of the opinion that a
municipality might under its police power, enact an ordi-
nance for the segregation of the white and colored races,
where proper protection was given to persons who had pre-
* viously acquired the right to the occupancy of buildings by
devise, descent, purchase, lease, or other contract.36 In
this case, the point in issue was the constitutionality of a
Baltimore ordinance which made it unlawful for any colored
person to move into or use as a residence or place of abode
any house or building, or any part thereof, located on any
block in which the houses, buildings, and the like, were used
in whole or part as residences and places of abode by white
persons, and vice versa. The defendant, a negro, was in-
dicted for violation of the ordinance. The court declared
the ordinance unconstitutional, because its provisions were
applicable to property owned prior to, or at the time of, its
enactment, and so, not being limited in its operation to after
acquired property, it was "a taking away of vested rights."
But "the object sought to be accomplished by this ordinance
U Statd r. Gurry, 121 Md. 534, 88 At! 228 (1913).
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is [was] one which properly admits of the exercise of the
police power," even though this particular piece of munici-
pal legislation could not be sustained as drawn.
The last few cases discussed above are sufficient to indi-
cate the .quite decided tendency on the part of the state
courts, particularly in the southern states, to sustain muni-
cipal regulations, unless clearly unreasonable or unless in
gross disregard of property rights acquired previous to the
enactment of the segregation ordinances. But the question,
in like manner as that of municipal zoning for aesthetic and
use purposes, is a question cognizable by the federal courts.
And, indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in Buchanan
v. Warley,3 7 has passed on the question and has arrived
at a result contrary to that reached by most of the state
courts which have had to consider the point. In that case,
which was error from the judgment of the Kentucky
Court,88 sustaining the Louisville ordinance which segre-
gated the races and prevented negroes from occupying
houses in blocks where the greater number of dwellings
were occupied by white persons, and vice versa, the Unit'ed
States Supreme Court reversed the State Court, and held
that colored persons are citizens of the United States and
have the right to purchase property and enjoy the use of
it without laws discriminating against them solely on ac-
count of color; and that an ordinance excluding negroes
from the occupancy of houses in blocks where the greater
number of houses are used as residences by white persons,
in effect, prevents the sale of lots in such blocks to individ-
uals of the African race, and is unconstitutional. The
Court reasoned to this effect: A property owner, who has
made an otherwise valid and enforceable contract to con-
vrey a piece of property to a colored person, for erection
thereupon of a house to be occupied by the vendee, is de-
prived of property, in that he is denied the right to sell to
a qualified purchaser; and, in a suit against the vendee for
specific performance, the vendor may attack the ordinance
as invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. An ordi-
nance excluding negroes from the occupancy of houses in
" 88 Sup. Ct. 16, 245 U. S. 60, 62 L. ed. 149 (1917).
88 Harris v. City of Louisville, 165 Ky. 559. 177 S. W. 472, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 149
(1915).
15
Hott: Constitutionality of Municipal Zoning and Segregation Ordinances
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1927
CONSTITUTIONAdLITY OF MUNICIPAL ZONING 347
which the greater number of residences are occupied by
white persons, and likewise forbidding Caucasians to live
in negro blocks, "and which bases the interdiction upon col-
or and nothing more, passes the legitimate bounds of police
power and invades the civil right to acquire, enjoy and use
property, which is guaranteed in equal measure to all citi-
zens, white or colored, by the Fourteenth Amendment."
The ordinance, the constitutionality of which is here as-
sailed, cannot be upheld merely because the purposes for
which it was enacted were to lessen miscegenation, prevent
deterioration of property owned and occupied by white
persons, and promote the public peace, by keeping the
races separate; nor does its impartial application to both
races "relieve it from the vice of discrimination or obviate
the objection that it deprives of property without due pro-
cess of law." The Supreme Court distinguished this hold-
ing from their decision in Pleasy v. Ferguson,38 and in the
Berea College Case.39
The decision of the United States Supreme Court, in the
Buchanan Case, must be recognized as controlling, when
the same question arises hereafter in the state courts; and,
in fact, the Maryland Court has already yielded to the
federal decision, in Jackson v. State,40 in which case the
principle is recognized that the right of a citizen to acquire
or use property cannot be validly restricted by a state or
municipality on the ground of his color. In this case, an
ordinance of Baltimore had been drawn so as to eliminate
the constitutional objection which had arisen in State v.
Curry,41 by being made applicable only to property ac-
quired after the enactment of the ordinance, but, neverthe-
less, it was held invalid, on the authority of Buchanan v.
Warley. The Maryland Court was of the opinion that,
while the Louisville ordinance forbade the occupancy of a
"168 U. S. 537 (1896). Ir this case, the United States Supreme Court sustained
a Louisiana statute, requiring railroad companies carrying passengers in that state to
provide equal but separate accommodations for the two races, and imposing penalties
upon passengers Insisting on entering a coach reserved for individuals of the other
race, holding that it did not violate the provisions of either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth
Amendments.
4 211 U. S. 45 (1908). In this case, the Federal Supreme Court stated that the
Kentucky statute authorizing the education of both whites and blacks by the same
corporation, but In different places, and prohibiting their education together, "does not
defeat the object of a grant to maintain a collegd for all persons ;" nor does it violate
the Federal Constitution.
'1 182 Md. a11, 103 AtI. 912 (1918).
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [1927], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol33/iss4/3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
house by an individual of one race in a block in which the
greater part of the places of abode were occupied by per-
sons of the other race and the Baltimore ordinance was
operative only where a person of one race attempted to
live in a block in which members of the other race were the
sole occupants, the two regulations were so nearly alike
that there was no material difference between them. Al-
though there may be room to doubt whether the construc-
tion which the United States Supreme Court has placed
upon the Fourteenth Amendment in its application to se-
gregation ordinances will accomplish as socially desirable
-, result as would have been attained by a contrary hold-
ing, the matter is a federal constitutional question, and so
doubtless the state courts will and must yield to its binding
authority. It seems to be the law now, at any rate, that
an ordinance forbidding negroes from living in blocks in
which a majority of the inhabitants are of the Caucasian
race, and vice versa, cannot be sustained. 41
But is the result arrived at in Buchanan v. Warley de-
sirable? Admitting that the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted for the purpose of protecting the political and econ-
omic rights, and to secure the equal treatment before the
law, of an inferior, dependent race only recently freed from
bondage, it is submitted that it does not follow that it was
ever intended that the Federal Government should attempt
to put the two peoples, so different in characteristics and ap-
titudes, upon a social equality. Their racial dissimilarity
and non-assimilability, intensified by a totally different cul-
tural background and centuries of racial development,
make such an idea wholly unfeasible and impracticable.
"Law is a practical matter," and so it should be recog-
nized that, while the two races should be accorded equal
treatment, the public welfare and the highest social inter-
ests of both Caucasian and African can best be secured by
preserving each people in its racial purity. Commingling
of the homes and places of abode of white men and black
men gives unnecessary provocation for miscegenation, race
riots, lynchings, and other forms of social malaise, existent
when a child-like, undisciplined, inferior race is living in
"Supra, n. 86.
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close contact with a people of more mature civilization. As
for the view that a segregation ordinance, excluding per-
sons of one or the other race from a given block or district
used for residences by the other race and thus, in effect,
preventing the sale of property, in the area affected, to the
excluded race, is a deprivation of property, the same objec-
tion should be equally applicable to municipal legislation
restricting the location of shops and places of business in
general. If a municipality can prevent the establishment
of a "Piggly-Wiggly" store in a residential section, without
violating any of the constitutional prohibitions, it should
follow that an ordinance, excluding negroes from a "white"
zone and vice versa, should, in the absence of infringement
of existing property rights, be constitutional. As the law
now is, such an ordinance is invalid; but, as Mr. Justice
Holmes has said,42 "every opinion tends to become a law,"
and it is to be hoped that public opinion may come to pre-
ponderate so strongly in favor of sustaining municipal race
segregation ordinances, drafted so as to be reasonable and
not to deprive of previously acquired property, that they
will ultimately be held constitutional.
19 ILL. L. REv. 401 (1925).
SHolmes' dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 76 (1905).
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